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The Effects of Evidence, Coherence and Credentials on Jury
Decision-Making in Child Sexual Abuse Trials
Bianca Klettke and Martine Powell
School of Psychology, Deakin University, Victoria, Australia
Expert testimony is being used increasingly in child sexual assault cases. This study
extended a prior study that examined factors related to expert testimony (evidence
strength, coherence and credentials of the expert) on ratings of guilt and overall verdict.
Specifically, we replicated our prior study but with two modifications: we used
community samples as opposed to university students, and participants made their
decisions in groups of 12 (as in the case of juries where one decision represents the
overall group) rather than having participants decide and submit their verdicts and guilt
ratings individually. Consistent with the prior (less ecologically valid) study, credentials
of the expert had negligible impact. Evidence that was high in strength elicited a
relatively high guilt rating even when the testimony was low in coherence. Further, it
appears that when participants deliberate in a group (as in the case of juries) they are
more conservative in their judgements (i.e., they are less likely to give a guilty verdict)
compared to individual jurors who make their decisions alone. These findings suggest
that caution must be exercised when drawing conclusions about the generalisability of
prior research findings where participants did not engage in group deliberation.
Key words: child sexual abuse; evidence; expert testimony; jury decision-making; witness
credibility.
Expert testimony is often used in child
sexual abuse litigation. In fact, the pre-
valence of psychological expert witnesses in
such cases is increasing due to widespread
concerns about poor legal outcomes for
these cases (e.g., low prosecution and
conviction rates) compared to other crimes
involving adult victims, such as assault
(Cossins, Goodman-Delahunty, & O’Brien,
2009; Fitzgerald, 2006). Despite the increas-
ing use of expert witnesses, there has been
little examination of the effect of this type of
testimony on jury decision-making. Fur-
ther, of the limited research conducted, the
findings have not been consistent. Some
studies have suggested that expert testi-
mony can be beneficial to child complai-
nants, for example, by restoring a child’s
credibility after cross-examination (Kovera
& Borgida, 1998; Myers, 2009). Other
research has suggested that expert testi-
mony can have a negative impact on the
outcome of trials (Hagen, 1997). The focus
of ongoing research, therefore, needs to be
on understanding the precise impact of
expert testimony and the factors that
moderate effects across various contexts.
This study extends prior work by
examining several factors related to the
expert and the expert’s testimonial account
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that potentially impact juror decisions in
child sexual abuse cases. In particular, this
study is a direct extension of a previous
study we conducted (Klettke, Graesser, &
Powell, 2010). The design of our previous
study was as follows: 64 jury-eligible
undergraduate university students, serving
as mock jurors, read eight short vignettes
depicting a case of child sexual abuse. They
then read the written testimony of a
psychological expert called by the prosecu-
tion in support of the child’s allegation.
The study explored three factors which we
anticipated may moderate the effect of
expert testimony on juror decision-making.
These factors include credentials of the
expert, strength of the evidence in support
of the witness statement and coherence of
the expert’s evidence. Each of these factors
had a high and low condition, resulting in a
2 6 2 6 2 factorial within-subject design.
After reading each vignette and expert
testimony, the mock jurors immediately
rated the guilt of the defendant, the
effectiveness of the expert and the cred-
ibility of the victim (using a 6-point Likert
scale) and they then chose an overall
verdict (guilty/not guilty). Overall, the
results revealed that guilt ratings of the
defendant were lower and the victim was
rated as less credible when both evidence
strength and coherence of the expert’s
testimony were low. The credentials of the
expert, however, had no impact on any of
the dependent variables. This null finding
involving credentials was consistent with
Levett and Kovera (2008), who also used
mock jurors in a child sexual abuse case.
The current study takes one (albeit
small) step towards advancing our knowl-
edge of the boundaries of an expert’s
impact by examining the generalisability
of prior findings using a modified, and
arguably more ecologically valid, design.
Specifically, we made two modifications.
The research participants in the current
study were members of the general com-
munity as opposed to university students.
Further, we examined the impact of the
variables (expert credentials, strength of the
evidence and coherence of the expert
evidence) on jury as opposed to juror
decision-making. In other words, rather
than having the participants make their
decisions about the guilt of the suspect in
isolation from one another as in the Klettke
et al. (2010) study, participants engaged in
the activity in groups of 12 and in a private
environment as a real jury would.
We anticipated that with this modified
design the credentials of the expert may
now impact decision-making. There are two
reasons for making this claim. First, with
juries there is greater likelihood that the
issue of credentials, along with the other
features of the expert, will be considered.
With juries it only takes one in 12 partici-
pants to identify an issue for that issue to be
considered by all the 12 participants.
Second, for those details that are identified,
juries are more likely to engage in the
process of deliberation compared to indivi-
dual jurors (Bornstein, 1999; Diamond,
1997; Golding, Dunlap, & Hodell, 2009).
When groups deliberate on an issue, their
decision-making becomes more conserva-
tive. For example, a meta-analysis con-
ducted by MacCoun and Kerr (1988)
indicated that participants’ aversion to
committing a type I error (that is, convict
a defendant who is not guilty) becomes
greater after deliberation than when parti-
cipants make decisions without discussing
the issue with others. Within the context of
the current study, juries as opposed to
jurors may be more vigilant in seeking
reasons not to convict defendants. If so, this
would feasibly increase the relevance of
factors such as expert credentials.
In sum, the current study extends prior
work by examining the impact of factors
related to expert witnesses in trials where an
allegation of sexual abuse is made by a
child. The unique contribution is that it
examines the effect of factors using mock
juries as opposed to jurors and, given the
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similarity in design, enables direct compar-
ison of overall verdict and guilt ratings
across the participants’ groups. Whereas
our previous study (using jurors) only found
guilt ratings to be influenced by evidence
strength and coherence, we expected all
variables to have an impact, with the rate of
overall convictions being less compared to
the previous research and with each variable
having an effect in its own right.
Method
Design
The present study used a 2 (high/low
evidence) 6 2 (high/low coherence) 6 2
(high/low credentials) factorial, repeated
measures design. The dependent variables
were guilt of the alleged offender as
measured by a 6-point Likert scale and
overall verdict as measured by a dichot-
omous variable of guilt/not guilt.
Participants
The study included 96 participants: 49
females and 47 males between the ages of
18 and 61 (M ¼ 31.48, SD ¼ 10.88). Parti-
cipants were recruited from the general
public in Victoria, Australia, via snowball
sampling. That is, participants who chose to
complete the study were asked to recruit
further potential participants. All partici-
pants were eligible to serve on a jury, that is,
they were at least 18 years of age and
Australian citizens. Participants were placed
in groups of 12 to simulate a ‘real life’ jury
scenario. The participants were informed
that they could leave the experiment at any
time if they so desired. Prior ethics approval
from Deakin University was obtained.
Materials
Eight separate vignettes of approximately
500 words each were created for this
experiment and presented in random order
for each jury. The vignettes, depicting child
sexual abuse cases, were modelled on
actual cases (Ceci & Bruck, 1995) and
victims ranged from 3 to 15 years of age. In
each scenario, a description of the allega-
tion was followed by the testimony of the
expert. The base scenario was held con-
stant across all manipulations and eight
versions of the expert testimony were
generated from all possible combinations
of the independent variables depicted
in Table 1. The credentials of the expert
were manipulated by the expert having
high versus low credentials and expertise.
For example, a high degree of publications
in the field versus a low degree of publica-
tions represented high versus low creden-
tials. Strength of evidence was manipulated
by how much the evidence presented by the
expert supported the case that the child had
been abused. Generally, in the condition of
high-strength evidence, the expert testified
that a child matched clinical and beha-
vioural symptoms of child sexual abuse,
such as bedwetting and nightmares. In the
case of low evidence, no physical evidence
was presented, or the clinical symptoms
were given an alternative explanation.
Coherence was manipulated by the pre-
sence/absence of an inconsistency or in the
overall testimony of the expert. In a high-
coherence testimony, the testimony ‘hung
well’ together without any contradictory
information; that is, the testimony pre-
sented by the expert was globally coherent.
Refer to our previous paper (Klettke
et al., 2010) for an example of the text
provided in relation to each level of the
independent variables (credentials, strength
of evidence and coherence) as well as an
example of a base scenario.
Table 1. Eight sub-conditions presented to the
participants.
Conditions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Evidence Hi Hi Hi Hi Lo Lo Lo Lo
Credentials Hi Hi Lo Lo Hi Hi Lo Lo
Coherence Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo Hi Lo
Jury Decision-Making 265
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Procedure
Participants met in groups of 12 at a time
and location of convenience and as ar-
ranged by the experimenter. They were
seated around a large table and were first
asked to read the Plain Language State-
ment outlining the study and then the
Consent form if they wished to participate.
Instructions were then read to the jury
outlining what their task was. Specifically,
participants were asked to act as a ‘real’
jury, and to choose a foreperson who
would subsequently be responsible for
filling out the questionnaires and chairing
the discussions. Each participant then read
one case of alleged child sexual abuse.
After reading each case individually, all
participants deliberated as a mock jury on
each of the two dependant variables.
Specifically, a dichotomous rating deter-
mined whether the subject thought that the
defendant was guilty/not guilty. Juries also
rated guilt of the defendant on a contin-
uous scale using the following values: (6)
guilty; (5) somewhat guilty; (4) not sure,
but probably guilty; (3) not sure, but
probably not guilty; (2) somewhat not
guilty; and (1) not guilty.
There were no hung juries or jury
nullifications, so once consensus among
all participants was reached the chosen
foreperson completed the questionnaire on
behalf of all participants in the group. This
procedure continued for all eight cases or
vignettes. No time limit was given; how-
ever, if the deliberation time for one case
lasted longer than 20 minutes, the jury was
encouraged to complete deliberation within
a further 10 minutes. None of the juries
required more than 30 minutes total
deliberation time per case. Participants
were able to refer back to the case while
rating it; however, after finishing one case,
participants were not permitted to go back
to the previous one.
Results
Table 2 displays the mean guilt ratings of
the defendant, as measured by a 6-point
Likert scale (rows 1 and 2). Table 2 also
displays the guilt of the defendant as meas-
ured by a dichotomous verdict (row 5). A 2
(coherence; high vs. low) 6 2 (strength of
evidence; strong vs. weak) 6 2 (credentials
of expert; high vs. low) analysis of variance
(ANOVAs) was conducted for each of these
dependent measures.
Guilt of the Defendant
Regarding the guilt of the defendant (rows 1
and 2), there was only one main effect,
Table 2. Mean Ratings of the Dependent Variables.
Evidence high Evidence low
Credentials
high
Credentials
low
Credentials
high
Credentials
low
Coherence Coherence Coherence Coherence
Dependent Variable high low high low high low high low
Guilt by Juries 4.63 4.83 4.63 5.00 4.50 4.63 4.50 4.13
STD 1.42 1.67 0.70 1.01 1.59 1.42 1.59 1.70
Guilt by Jurors1 5.17 5.38 5.42 5.22 5.23 4.61 5.19 4.60
STD 1.28 0.98 0.97 1.09 1.15 1.45 1.26 1.63
Guilty verdict by Juries 63% 75% 50% 50% 50% 63% 63% 50%
Guilty verdict by Jurors1 80% 88% 89% 88% 78% 64% 86% 66%
Note1: Juror results were originally reported in Klettke et al. (2010).
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which was for strength of evidence,
F(1,95) ¼ 7.50, MSE ¼ 2.84, p 5 .01,
Zp
2 ¼ .073. The mock juries rated the guilt
of the defendant as higher when the expert
presented high (M ¼ 4.77, SD ¼ .079)
rather? than low (M ¼ 4.44, SD ¼ .079)
strength of evidence. Neither the creden-
tials of the expert (F(1, 95) ¼ .35, MSE ¼
3.83, p ¼ .56, Zp2 ¼ .004) nor coherence of
the testimony (F(1, 95) ¼ .82, MSE ¼
1.62, p ¼ .37, Zp2 ¼ .009) had an effect.
The only other significant finding was an
interaction between evidence and coher-
ence (F(1, 95) ¼ 14.89, MSE ¼ .56,
p 5 .0001, Zp
2 ¼ .136). To determine the
nature of the interaction, planned compar-
ison t-tests were performed on evidence
and coherence, collapsed across creden-
tials. The results indicated that expert
testimony based on high-strength evidence
and low coherence (M ¼ 4.92, SD ¼ 1.13,
SEM ¼ .12) yielded significantly higher
guilt ratings than (1) a narrative with high
evidence and high coherence M ¼ 4.63,
SD ¼ .65, SEM ¼ .07, t (1,63) ¼ 72.77,
p 5 .01, (2) a narrative with low evidence
and highcoherence M ¼ 4.5, SD ¼ .75,
SEM ¼ .08, t (1,63) ¼ 2.65, p 5 .05) and
(3) a narrative with lowevidence and low
coherence M ¼ 4.38, SD ¼ 1.09, SEM ¼
.11 , t (1,63) ¼ 3.56, p 5 .005, while the
latter three groups did not differ from one
another. More specifically, the interaction
indicated that when evidence was high and
coherence low, the guilt of the defendant
was rated higher by the mock juries than in
any other condition.
Overall Verdict
A Wilcoxon signed rank test was per-
formed on the binary dependent variable
overall judgment – that is, the juries’ final
verdict on whether the defendant was
guilty or not guilty. Table 2 (row 5) reports
the proportion of times that mock juries
chose a guilty verdict. Similar to the results
of the continuous variable, the results from
the dichotomous variable indicated that
expert testimony which was high in evi-
dence, low in coherence and high in
credentials resulted in greater guilty ver-
dicts (M ¼ 75%) than (a) testimony low in
evidence, low in coherence and high in
credentials (M ¼ 62.5%) (Z ¼ 73.46,
p 5 .01), (b) testimony with low evidence,
high coherence and high credentials
(M ¼ 50%) (Z ¼ 74.90, p 5 .001) and
(c) testimony high in evidence, high in
coherence and low in credentials
(M ¼ 50%) (Z ¼ 74.9, p 5 .001). It is
interesting to note that if both the evidence
presented and the credentials of the expert
were low, whether the testimony was high
in coherence (M ¼ 50%) or low in coher-
ence (M ¼ 50%) had no effect on guilty
verdicts (Z ¼ .0, p ¼ 1.0). Overall, and
similar to the results of the continuous
variable guilt of the defendant, these results
indicate that a passage which was high in
evidence and low in coherence tended to
result in greater guilty verdicts than when a
passage was high in evidence and high in
coherence.
Comparing the Overall Guilt and Verdict
Ratings with Prior Research Involving
Jurors
Table 2 includes mean ratings from our
previous study using mock jurors (i.e.,
Klettke et al., 2010). These ratings are
presented in rows three and four for the
continuous variable of guilt and row six for
the verdict. An ANOVA comparing parti-
cipant group revealed that, overall, guilt
ratings as judged by mock juries
(M ¼ 4.60, SD ¼ 0.49) were significantly
lower than those by mock jurors
(M ¼ 5.10, SD ¼ 0.62), F (1,
159) ¼ 32.10, p 5 .001. With regards to
the overall verdict, a Wilcoxon analysis
yielded similar results, as mock juries were
significantly less likely to convict overall
(M ¼ 58%) than mock jurors (M ¼ 79%),
Z ¼ 73.257, p 5 .001. When examining
Jury Decision-Making 267
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the means for each of the eight sub-
conditions in Table 2, the pattern was
consistent with the overall effect reported
above – both verdicts and guilt ratings, as
judged by mock juries, were lower than
when mock jurors conducted the decision-
making.
Discussion
Overall, three conclusions can be made
from this study. First, our findings indicate
that the negligible impact of credentials in
our previous study (Klettke et al., 2010)
cannot be attributed to the fact that
individual jurors made their ratings as
opposed to juries (i.e., groups of partici-
pants who deliberated about their deci-
sions). Like the Klettke et al. (2010) study,
and other research by Levett and Kovera
(2008), we found that the credentials of the
psychological expert had no effect on juror
or jury ratings in a child sexual abuse case.
Second, on the basis of the current
results, it would appear that strength of
evidence presented by the expert in support
of the child’s testimony has more impact on
jury decision-making than either the cre-
dentials or the coherence of the testimony.
The mock juries rated the guilt of the
defendant as higher when the evidence
presented by the expert was strong as
opposed to weak. Expert testimony where-
by the evidence was high in strength elicited
relatively high guilt ratings even when the
expert testimony was low in coherence.
However, further work is needed to under-
stand the impact of evidence because our
results were not entirely robust. The higher
guilt ratings for strong evidence did not
consistently result in higher guilty verdicts.
Further, it is difficult to explain why
evidence that was high in strength and
high coherence was associated with lower
guilt ratings than evidence that was high in
evidence strength and low in coherence.
Finally, considering the results across
our current and previous study (Klettke
et al., 2010) it appears that when research
participants deliberate in a group (as in the
case of juries), they are more conservative in
their judgements compared to research
participants who make their responses
individually. In other words, when partici-
pants deliberate in a group they are more
reticent to convict the defendant compared
to when they deliberate as individuals; this
finding is consistent with conclusions made
elsewhere (e.g., MacCoun & Kerr, 1988).
While the present study used a different
sample (i.e., members of the general public)
compared to our previous study (i.e.,
university students), it cannot be argued
that the sample was responsible for the
leniency bias juries displayed towards the
defendant. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue
that the different samples may actually have
underestimated the current differences in
guilt ratings across the two studies. When
prior studies have found differences in guilt
ratings between community members and
university students, this has always been in
favour of university students being more
lenient towards the defendant (e.g., Berman
& Cutler, 1996; Schuller & Hastings, 1996;
Simon & Mahan, 1971).
In conclusion, research examining the
impact of expert testimony on jury deci-
sion-making is still in its infancy. Until we
can explain the differences in findings
across prior studies and until we more
fully explore decision-making across parti-
cipant groups, caution should be exercised
when drawing conclusions about the gen-
eralisability of prior research findings,
particularly research findings based on the
guilt ratings of individual jurors.
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